[arsc-ml 33] ARSC-mlからのお知らせ

[nhosoe ＠ grips.ac.jp]

□名前:細江宣裕
□所属:政策研究大学院大学
□会員:会員
□お知らせの内容:研究会関連
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□内容
　:各位
　お世話になります。リマインダです。

来週末土曜日に、以下の通り研究会を開催いたします。ふるってご参加ください。

http://www3.grips.ac.jp/~nhosoe/pmw/index.html

細江宣裕・政策研究大学院大学

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第5回

日時: 2015年10月31日(土)

場所: 政策研究大学院大学 4階 会議室4B

地図: http://www.grips.ac.jp/jp/docs/map.pdf

14:00-15:50

講演者: 長谷川誠 氏 (政策研究大学院大学)

題目: The Effect of Moving to a Territorial Tax System on Profit
Repatriation: Evidence from Japan (with Kozo Kiyota)

概要: In an increasingly globalized world, the design of international
tax systems in terms of taxation on foreign corporate incomes has
received much attention from policymakers and economists alike. In the
past, Japan's worldwide tax system taxed foreign source income upon
repatriation. However, to stimulate dividend repatriations from
Japanese-owned foreign affiliates, Japan introduced a foreign dividend
exemption in 2009 that exempts dividends remitted by Japanese-owned
foreign affiliates to their parent firms from home taxation. This
paper examines the effect of this dividend exemption on profit
repatriations by Japanese multinationals. We find that the response of
Japanese-owned affiliates to the dividend exemption was heterogeneous.
More particularly, foreign affiliates with a large stock of retained
earnings were generally more responsive to the reform and
significantly increased dividend payments to their parent firms in
response to the enactment of the dividend exemption system. Dividend
payments by these affiliates also became more sensitive to withholding
tax rates on dividends levied by host countries under the new
exemption system.

16:10-18:00

講演者: 椋寛 氏 (学習院大学)

題目: Does preferential trade liberalization promote antidumping actions
against nonmembers?

概要: In a three-country oligopoly model, this paper analyzes two
countries’ decisions concerning antidumping (AD) action against each
other and the relationship between those decisions and the countries’
RTAs with the third-country. An RTA intensifies product-market
competition in the domestic market and lowers product prices. This
effect widens the dumping margin of the foreign firm and narrows the
dumping margin of the domestic firm. If the government is more
concerned with domestic firm profit in its AD decision, the RTA may
invoke the member’s AD action against the nonmember. If the
governments attach a sufficiently high value on social welfare,
however, the RTA may promote the nonmember’s AD action against the
member. If the governments’ weight on the domestic firm’s profit is
neither high nor low, an RTA may block the AD actions of both
countries. If both countries have RTAs with the third country, both
countries become less willing to use AD action.

第6回
日時: 2016年1月30日(土)
場所: 政策研究大学院大学 4階 会議室4B

14:00-15:50
講演者: 菊地雄太 氏 (横浜国立大学)
題目: T.B.A.
概要: T.B.A.

16:10-18:00
講演者: 伊藤萬里 氏 (専修大学)
題目: T.B.A.
概要: T.B.A.

第7回
日時: 2016年2月27日(土)
場所: 政策研究大学院大学 4階 会議室4B

14:00-15:50
講演者: 高橋孝明 氏 (東京大学)
題目: T.B.A.
概要: T.B.A.

16:10-18:00
講演者: 楡井誠 氏 (一橋大学)
題目: T.B.A.
概要: T.B.A.

-- 
Nobuhiro Hosoe, Ph. D.
Associate Professor, Director of MP1/MP2 Program
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS)
7-22-1 Roppongi, Minato, Tokyo 106-8677, Japan
Tel: +81-3-6439-6129, Fax: +81-3-6439-6010, E-mail: nhosoe ＠ grips.ac.jp
URL: http://www3.grips.ac.jp/~nhosoe/
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Textbook of CGE Modeling: Programming and Simulations
[JPN: 4130090801], [ENG: 0230248144], [CHN: 7565415316]
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