[arsc-ml 78] ARSC-mlからのお知らせ

[nhosoe ＠ grips.ac.jp]

□名前:細江宣裕
□所属:政策研究大学院大学
□会員:会員
□お知らせの内容:研究会関連
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□内容
　:各位
　お世話になります。
早速ですが、2016年度第1回目の研究会の予定が決定いたしましたのでご案内させていただきます。
ふるってご参加ください。
http://www3.grips.ac.jp/~nhosoe/pmw/index.html


細江・政策研究大学院大学

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第1回

日時: 2016年7月30日(土)

場所: 政策研究大学院大学 4階 会議室4B

14:00-15:50

講演者: 石原章史氏 (政策研究大学院大学)

題目: On Multitasking and Job Design in Relational Contracts

概要: We investigate the optimal job design in a repeated principal-agent relationship with multiple tasks where the performance measurement is distorted, aggregated, and nonverifiable. We compare task bundling, where all the tasks are assigned to a single agent, with task separation, where the tasks are split and assigned to two agents. Compared to task bundling, task separation mitigates misallocation of effort among the tasks but requires more commitment due to dispersion of informal bonuses to multiple agents. Consequently, task separation is better than task bundling if and only if the discount factor of the parties is high. We also consider an extended model in which the principal combines explicit incentive pays based on a verifiable and distorted signal. In such cases, task separation is optimal if the discount factor is sufficiently high or sufficiently low.

16:10-18:00

講演者: 若森直樹氏 (東京大学)

題目: The Welfare Consequences of Free Entry in Vertical Relationships: The Case of the MRI Market

概要: This paper quantifies the welfare consequences of the medical arms race in the context of MRI adoption. Our data suggest that the vertical structure of the industry and the endogeneous product choice are the key determinants to understand the MRI adoption behavior of medical institutions. Thus, the paper builds and estimates a model of the vertical structure of the industry where MRI manufacturers sell high- and low-quality MRIs to hospitals in the upstream market, whereas medical institutions provide medical services to patients in the downstream market. Simulation results suggest that the current free-entry policy in Japan leads to excess MRI adoption, even distorting the composition of high- and low-quality MRIs. Furthermore, softening competition among the MRI manufacturers or regulating medical institutions' MRI adoption would increase social welfare substantially by mitigating the business-stealing effect in the downstream market. These findings shed light on the mechanism behind the social inefficiency of medical arms races.


★ポリシー・モデリング・コンファレンス2016@香川大学
日付:2016年9月3日(土)

報告予定(報告時間、報告順ともに未定):

大湾秀雄(東京大学) Monetary Incentives for Corporate Inventors: Intrinsic Motivation, Project Selection and Inventive Performance
鈴木通雄(東京大学) Identification and Estimation of Production Function with Unobserved Heterogeneity
伊藤萬里(青山学院大学) Patent Law Harmonization and International Trade
石瀬寛和(大阪大学) Inflation as a Long-run Optimal Policy in an Open Economy
井上寛康(兵庫県立大学) The Strength of Long Ties and the Weakness of Strong Ties: Knowledge Diffusion through Supply Chain Networks
北野泰樹(青山学院大学) Measures to Promote Green Cars: Evaluation at the Car Variant Level


-- 
Nobuhiro Hosoe, Ph. D.
Associate Professor, Director of MP1/MP2 Program
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS)
7-22-1 Roppongi, Minato, Tokyo 106-8677, Japan
Tel: +81-3-6439-6129, Fax: +81-3-6439-6010, E-mail: nhosoe ＠ grips.ac.jp
URL: http://www3.grips.ac.jp/~nhosoe/
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Textbook of CGE Modeling: Programming and Simulations
[JPN (2nd edition): 4130402722], [ENG: 0230248144], [CHN: 7565415316]
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