[arsc-ml 81] ARSC-mlからのお知らせ

[nhosoe ＠ grips.ac.jp]

□名前:細江宣裕
□所属:政策研究大学院大学
□会員:会員
□お知らせの内容:研究会関連
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□内容
　:研究会参加者各位
　お世話になります。
リマインダです。7/30に以下の通り研究会を開催いたします。
ふるってご参加ください。

細江@政策研究大学院大学
http://www3.grips.ac.jp/~nhosoe/pmw/index.html

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2016年度(予定)

第1回

日時: 2016年7月30日(土)

場所: 政策研究大学院大学 4階 会議室4B

14:00-15:50

講演者: 石原章史氏 (政策研究大学院大学)

題目: On Multitasking and Job Design in Relational Contracts

概要: We investigate the optimal job design in a repeated principal-agent relationship with multiple tasks where the performance measurement is distorted, aggregated, and nonverifiable. We compare task bundling, where all the tasks are assigned to a single agent, with task separation, where the tasks are split and assigned to two agents. Compared to task bundling, task separation mitigates misallocation of effort among the tasks but requires more commitment due to dispersion of informal bonuses to multiple agents. Consequently, task separation is better than task bundling if and only if the discount factor of the parties is high. We also consider an extended model in which the principal combines explicit incentive pays based on a verifiable and distorted signal. In such cases, task separation is optimal if the discount factor is sufficiently high or sufficiently low.

16:10-18:00

講演者: 若森直樹氏 (東京大学)

題目: The Welfare Consequences of Free Entry in Vertical Relationships: The Case of the MRI Market

概要: This paper quantifies the welfare consequences of the medical arms race in the context of MRI adoption. Our data suggest that the vertical structure of the industry and the endogeneous product choice are the key determinants to understand the MRI adoption behavior of medical institutions. Thus, the paper builds and estimates a model of the vertical structure of the industry where MRI manufacturers sell high- and low-quality MRIs to hospitals in the upstream market, whereas medical institutions provide medical services to patients in the downstream market. Simulation results suggest that the current free-entry policy in Japan leads to excess MRI adoption, even distorting the composition of high- and low-quality MRIs. Furthermore, softening competition among the MRI manufacturers or regulating medical institutions' MRI adoption would increase social welfare substantially by mitigating the business-stealing effect in the downstream market. These findings shed light on the mechanism behind the social inefficiency of medical arms races.



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PMC2016@香川大学

ポリシー・モデリング・コンファレンス2016

　ポリシー・モデリング・コンファレンス2016を下記の要領で開催いたします。ふるってご参加下さい。なお、会場・資料等の用意の関係上、ご参加される場合には、できれば事前にメールで細江()までご連絡いただければ幸いです。

(プログラム詳細決定, 2016/7/20)

日付:2016年9月3日(土)
時間:TBA
会場:香川大学 大学院地域マネジメント研究科

http://www3.grips.ac.jp/~nhosoe/pmw/index.html#pmc2016



-- 
Nobuhiro Hosoe, Ph. D.
Associate Professor, Director of MP1/MP2 Program
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS)
7-22-1 Roppongi, Minato, Tokyo 106-8677, Japan
Tel: +81-3-6439-6129, Fax: +81-3-6439-6010, E-mail: nhosoe ＠ grips.ac.jp
URL: http://www3.grips.ac.jp/~nhosoe/
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Textbook of CGE Modeling: Programming and Simulations
[JPN (2nd edition): 4130402722], [ENG: 0230248144], [CHN: 75654153
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